19 results
Participant characteristics and self-reported weight status in a cross-sectional pilot survey of self-identified followers of popular diets: Adhering to Dietary Approaches for Personal Taste (ADAPT) Feasibility Survey
- Micaela C Karlsen, Alice H Lichtenstein, Christina D Economos, Sara C Folta, Remco Chang, Gail Rogers, Paul F Jacques, Kara A Livingston, Nicola M McKeown
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- Journal:
- Public Health Nutrition / Volume 23 / Issue 15 / October 2020
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 27 July 2020, pp. 2717-2727
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Objective:
To describe characteristics of self-identified popular diet followers and compare mean BMI across these diets, stratified by time following diet.
Design:Cross-sectional, web-based survey administered in 2015.
Setting:Non-localised, international survey.
Participants:Self-selected followers of popular diets (n 9019) were recruited to the survey via social media and email announcements by diet community leaders, categorised into eight major diet groups.
Results:General linear models were used to compare mean BMI among (1) short-term (<1 year) and long-term (≥1 year) followers within diet groups and (2) those identifying as ‘try to eat healthy’ (TTEH) to all other diet groups, stratified by time following the specific diet. Participants were 82 % female, 93 % White and 96 % non-Hispanic. Geometric mean BMI was lower (P < 0·05 for all) among longer-term followers (≥1 year) of whole food, plant-based (WFPB), vegan, whole food and low-carb diets compared with shorter-term followers. Among those following their diet for 1–5 years (n 4067), geometric mean BMI (kg/m2) were lower (P < 0·05 for all) for all groups compared with TTEH (26·4 kg/m2): WFPB (23·2 kg/m2), vegan (23·5 kg/m2), Paleo (24·6 kg/m2), vegetarian (25·0 kg/m2), whole food (24·6 kg/m2), Weston A. Price (23·5 kg/m2) and low-carb (24·7 kg/m2).
Conclusion:Our findings suggest that BMI is lower among individuals who made active decisions to adhere to a specific diet, particularly more plant-based diets and/or diets limiting highly processed foods, compared with those who simply TTEH. BMI is also lower among individuals who follow intentional eating plans for longer time periods.
12 - Lacan, Deleuze and the Consequences of Formalism
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- By Paul M. Livingston, Northwestern University Press
- Edited by Boštjan Nedoh, Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Andreja Zevnik, University of Manchester
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- Book:
- Lacan and Deleuze
- Published by:
- Edinburgh University Press
- Published online:
- 20 April 2017
- Print publication:
- 20 April 2017, pp 203-220
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Summary
There is a particular use of formalism in Deleuze and Lacan, essentially counterpoised to the thought of the signifier's adequate sense, but nevertheless decisive, for both, in witnessing its possible passage to a truth. This use of formalism is, as I shall argue, continuous both with twentiethcentury developments of the attempt to found mathematics on a purely logical writing and with the original sense of ‘form’ (eidos) as the thinkable unity of ‘one over many’, with which Plato sought to capture the possible contact of thought with what is real in itself. It is to be distinguished, on the other hand, from any exterior translation of natural language into formal symbolism or, conversely, the simple ‘application’ of fixed formalsymbolic calculi to an already constituted field. It is also not simply a matter of ‘structuralism’. For before the ‘structuralist’ reference to natural languages as systems of arbitrarily or conventionally posited differences lie, as its conditions of possibility and the grounds of its coherence, the problems to which formalism answers for both Deleuze and Lacan: those (for instance) of the totality of possible signification, the structure and genesis of the possible sense of signs, and the topological position from which these conditions can themselves be assayed. Thus rather than a simple regimentation or application of formal systems of signification, the use of formalism in Deleuze and Lacan involves finding the possible passage of signification to its specific limit: the place where, formalising the limits of its own mimetic or representational capacities, formalism itself marks, at its own impasse, a new possible inscription of truth. At this place, as I shall argue, it also witnesses the constitution of linguistic sense, the first entry of something like a ‘one’ into a world of otherwise pure multiplicity, and thereby the point, beyond possible representation, of thought's possible contact with being in itself.
In the following, I present this use of formalism, as it is developed most centrally in Lacan's Seminars XVII, XIX and XX, and in Deleuze's works of roughly the same period, especially his 1968 doctoral thesis, Difference and Repetition, and the closely related 1969 The Logic of Sense. This is not to prejudice, or presumptively exclude, the different or differently articulated positions that both thinkers would take with respect to formalism before or after the period I consider here.
5 - Univocity, Duality, and Ideal Genesis: Deleuze and Plato
- Edited by Abraham Jacob Greenstine, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Ryan J. Johnson
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- Book:
- Contemporary Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics
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- Edinburgh University Press
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- 07 May 2021
- Print publication:
- 31 March 2017, pp 65-85
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Summary
In Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze outlines a theory of ideas as problems, existent on the level of a virtuality distinct from, but irreducibly related to, that of their incarnation in a variety of specifically constituted theoretical domains:
Following Lautman and Vuillemin's work on mathematics, ‘structuralism’ seems to us the only means by which a genetic method can achieve its ambitions. It is sufficient to understand that the genesis takes place not between one actual term, however small, and another actual term in time, but between the virtual and its actualisation – in other words, it goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal connections to actual terms and diverse real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time. This is a genesis without dynamism, evolving necessarily in the element of a supra-historicity, a static genesis which may be understood as the correlate of the notion of passive synthesis, and which in turn illuminates that notion.
Deleuze's identification of ideas with problems is adopted, in part, from the novel synthesis proposed by the mathematical philosopher Albert Lautman in a series of essays of the 1930s and 1940s, of an unorthodox but textually grounded Platonism and the mathematics of his time. Deleuze takes Lautman's work to provide at least partial means for a reconciliation of structure and genesis, so that an account of the virtual structure of an idea-problem can at the same time, and without irreducible tension, function as an account of its real genesis in a specific, concrete domain. This yields Deleuze's understanding of ideal genesis, which involves at once an account of the origin of “actual terms and diverse real relations” and an account of the origin of those “differential elements and ideal connections” that precede and determine them. The principle underlying both origins is that of a paradoxical structural becoming which realizes the concrete relations characteristic of a particular field on the basis of a prior “dialectic” of formal/structural relationships, in particular those of limit, unlimitedness, multiplicity, and unity.
5 - Univocity, Duality, and Ideal Genesis: Deleuze and Plato
- from Part I - Plato
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- By John Bova, University of New Mexico, Paul M. Livingston, University of New Mexico
- Edited by Abraham Jacob Greenstine, Duquesne University, Ryan J. Johnson, Elon University
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- Book:
- Contemporary Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics
- Published by:
- Edinburgh University Press
- Published online:
- 03 January 2018
- Print publication:
- 08 March 2017, pp 65-85
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Summary
In Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze outlines a theory of ideas as problems, existent on the level of a virtuality distinct from, but irreducibly related to, that of their incarnation in a variety of specifically constituted theoretical domains:
Following Lautman and Vuillemin's work on mathematics, ‘structuralism’ seems to us the only means by which a genetic method can achieve its ambitions. It is sufficient to understand that the genesis takes place not between one actual term, however small, and another actual term in time, but between the virtual and its actualisation – in other words, it goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal connections to actual terms and diverse real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time. This is a genesis without dynamism, evolving necessarily in the element of a supra-historicity, a static genesis which may be understood as the correlate of the notion of passive synthesis, and which in turn illuminates that notion.
Deleuze's identification of ideas with problems is adopted, in part, from the novel synthesis proposed by the mathematical philosopher Albert Lautman in a series of essays of the 1930s and 1940s, of an unorthodox but textually grounded Platonism and the mathematics of his time. Deleuze takes Lautman's work to provide at least partial means for a reconciliation of structure and genesis, so that an account of the virtual structure of an idea-problem can at the same time, and without irreducible tension, function as an account of its real genesis in a specific, concrete domain. This yields Deleuze's understanding of ideal genesis, which involves at once an account of the origin of “actual terms and diverse real relations” and an account of the origin of those “differential elements and ideal connections” that precede and determine them. The principle underlying both origins is that of a paradoxical structural becoming which realizes the concrete relations characteristic of a particular field on the basis of a prior “dialectic” of formal/structural relationships, in particular those of limit, unlimitedness, multiplicity, and unity.
Contributors
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- By Rose Teteki Abbey, K. C. Abraham, David Tuesday Adamo, LeRoy H. Aden, Efrain Agosto, Victor Aguilan, Gillian T. W. Ahlgren, Charanjit Kaur AjitSingh, Dorothy B E A Akoto, Giuseppe Alberigo, Daniel E. Albrecht, Ruth Albrecht, Daniel O. Aleshire, Urs Altermatt, Anand Amaladass, Michael Amaladoss, James N. Amanze, Lesley G. Anderson, Thomas C. Anderson, Victor Anderson, Hope S. Antone, María Pilar Aquino, Paula Arai, Victorio Araya Guillén, S. Wesley Ariarajah, Ellen T. Armour, Brett Gregory Armstrong, Atsuhiro Asano, Naim Stifan Ateek, Mahmoud Ayoub, John Alembillah Azumah, Mercedes L. García Bachmann, Irena Backus, J. Wayne Baker, Mieke Bal, Lewis V. Baldwin, William Barbieri, António Barbosa da Silva, David Basinger, Bolaji Olukemi Bateye, Oswald Bayer, Daniel H. Bays, Rosalie Beck, Nancy Elizabeth Bedford, Guy-Thomas Bedouelle, Chorbishop Seely Beggiani, Wolfgang Behringer, Christopher M. Bellitto, Byard Bennett, Harold V. Bennett, Teresa Berger, Miguel A. Bernad, Henley Bernard, Alan E. Bernstein, Jon L. Berquist, Johannes Beutler, Ana María Bidegain, Matthew P. Binkewicz, Jennifer Bird, Joseph Blenkinsopp, Dmytro Bondarenko, Paulo Bonfatti, Riet en Pim Bons-Storm, Jessica A. Boon, Marcus J. Borg, Mark Bosco, Peter C. Bouteneff, François Bovon, William D. Bowman, Paul S. Boyer, David Brakke, Richard E. Brantley, Marcus Braybrooke, Ian Breward, Ênio José da Costa Brito, Jewel Spears Brooker, Johannes Brosseder, Nicholas Canfield Read Brown, Robert F. Brown, Pamela K. Brubaker, Walter Brueggemann, Bishop Colin O. Buchanan, Stanley M. Burgess, Amy Nelson Burnett, J. Patout Burns, David B. Burrell, David Buttrick, James P. Byrd, Lavinia Byrne, Gerado Caetano, Marcos Caldas, Alkiviadis Calivas, William J. Callahan, Salvatore Calomino, Euan K. Cameron, William S. Campbell, Marcelo Ayres Camurça, Daniel F. Caner, Paul E. Capetz, Carlos F. Cardoza-Orlandi, Patrick W. Carey, Barbara Carvill, Hal Cauthron, Subhadra Mitra Channa, Mark D. Chapman, James H. Charlesworth, Kenneth R. Chase, Chen Zemin, Luciano Chianeque, Philip Chia Phin Yin, Francisca H. Chimhanda, Daniel Chiquete, John T. Chirban, Soobin Choi, Robert Choquette, Mita Choudhury, Gerald Christianson, John Chryssavgis, Sejong Chun, Esther Chung-Kim, Charles M. A. Clark, Elizabeth A. Clark, Sathianathan Clarke, Fred Cloud, John B. Cobb, W. Owen Cole, John A Coleman, John J. Collins, Sylvia Collins-Mayo, Paul K. Conkin, Beth A. Conklin, Sean Connolly, Demetrios J. Constantelos, Michael A. Conway, Paula M. Cooey, Austin Cooper, Michael L. Cooper-White, Pamela Cooper-White, L. William Countryman, Sérgio Coutinho, Pamela Couture, Shannon Craigo-Snell, James L. Crenshaw, David Crowner, Humberto Horacio Cucchetti, Lawrence S. Cunningham, Elizabeth Mason Currier, Emmanuel Cutrone, Mary L. Daniel, David D. Daniels, Robert Darden, Rolf Darge, Isaiah Dau, Jeffry C. Davis, Jane Dawson, Valentin Dedji, John W. de Gruchy, Paul DeHart, Wendy J. Deichmann Edwards, Miguel A. De La Torre, George E. Demacopoulos, Thomas de Mayo, Leah DeVun, Beatriz de Vasconcellos Dias, Dennis C. Dickerson, John M. Dillon, Luis Miguel Donatello, Igor Dorfmann-Lazarev, Susanna Drake, Jonathan A. Draper, N. Dreher Martin, Otto Dreydoppel, Angelyn Dries, A. J. Droge, Francis X. D'Sa, Marilyn Dunn, Nicole Wilkinson Duran, Rifaat Ebied, Mark J. Edwards, William H. Edwards, Leonard H. Ehrlich, Nancy L. Eiesland, Martin Elbel, J. Harold Ellens, Stephen Ellingson, Marvin M. Ellison, Robert Ellsberg, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Eldon Jay Epp, Peter C. Erb, Tassilo Erhardt, Maria Erling, Noel Leo Erskine, Gillian R. Evans, Virginia Fabella, Michael A. Fahey, Edward Farley, Margaret A. Farley, Wendy Farley, Robert Fastiggi, Seena Fazel, Duncan S. Ferguson, Helwar Figueroa, Paul Corby Finney, Kyriaki Karidoyanes FitzGerald, Thomas E. FitzGerald, John R. Fitzmier, Marie Therese Flanagan, Sabina Flanagan, Claude Flipo, Ronald B. Flowers, Carole Fontaine, David Ford, Mary Ford, Stephanie A. Ford, Jim Forest, William Franke, Robert M. Franklin, Ruth Franzén, Edward H. Friedman, Samuel Frouisou, Lorelei F. Fuchs, Jojo M. Fung, Inger Furseth, Richard R. Gaillardetz, Brandon Gallaher, China Galland, Mark Galli, Ismael García, Tharscisse Gatwa, Jean-Marie Gaudeul, Luis María Gavilanes del Castillo, Pavel L. Gavrilyuk, Volney P. Gay, Metropolitan Athanasios Geevargis, Kondothra M. George, Mary Gerhart, Simon Gikandi, Maurice Gilbert, Michael J. Gillgannon, Verónica Giménez Beliveau, Terryl Givens, Beth Glazier-McDonald, Philip Gleason, Menghun Goh, Brian Golding, Bishop Hilario M. Gomez, Michelle A. Gonzalez, Donald K. Gorrell, Roy Gottfried, Tamara Grdzelidze, Joel B. Green, Niels Henrik Gregersen, Cristina Grenholm, Herbert Griffiths, Eric W. Gritsch, Erich S. Gruen, Christoffer H. Grundmann, Paul H. Gundani, Jon P. Gunnemann, Petre Guran, Vidar L. Haanes, Jeremiah M. Hackett, Getatchew Haile, Douglas John Hall, Nicholas Hammond, Daphne Hampson, Jehu J. Hanciles, Barry Hankins, Jennifer Haraguchi, Stanley S. Harakas, Anthony John Harding, Conrad L. Harkins, J. William Harmless, Marjory Harper, Amir Harrak, Joel F. Harrington, Mark W. Harris, Susan Ashbrook Harvey, Van A. Harvey, R. Chris Hassel, Jione Havea, Daniel Hawk, Diana L. Hayes, Leslie Hayes, Priscilla Hayner, S. Mark Heim, Simo Heininen, Richard P. Heitzenrater, Eila Helander, David Hempton, Scott H. Hendrix, Jan-Olav Henriksen, Gina Hens-Piazza, Carter Heyward, Nicholas J. Higham, David Hilliard, Norman A. Hjelm, Peter C. Hodgson, Arthur Holder, M. Jan Holton, Dwight N. Hopkins, Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, Po-Ho Huang, James Hudnut-Beumler, Jennifer S. Hughes, Leonard M. Hummel, Mary E. Hunt, Laennec Hurbon, Mark Hutchinson, Susan E. Hylen, Mary Beth Ingham, H. Larry Ingle, Dale T. Irvin, Jon Isaak, Paul John Isaak, Ada María Isasi-Díaz, Hans Raun Iversen, Margaret C. Jacob, Arthur James, Maria Jansdotter-Samuelsson, David Jasper, Werner G. Jeanrond, Renée Jeffery, David Lyle Jeffrey, Theodore W. Jennings, David H. Jensen, Robin Margaret Jensen, David Jobling, Dale A. Johnson, Elizabeth A. Johnson, Maxwell E. Johnson, Sarah Johnson, Mark D. Johnston, F. Stanley Jones, James William Jones, John R. Jones, Alissa Jones Nelson, Inge Jonsson, Jan Joosten, Elizabeth Judd, Mulambya Peggy Kabonde, Robert Kaggwa, Sylvester Kahakwa, Isaac Kalimi, Ogbu U. Kalu, Eunice Kamaara, Wayne C. Kannaday, Musimbi Kanyoro, Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Frank Kaufmann, Léon Nguapitshi Kayongo, Richard Kearney, Alice A. Keefe, Ralph Keen, Catherine Keller, Anthony J. Kelly, Karen Kennelly, Kathi Lynn Kern, Fergus Kerr, Edward Kessler, George Kilcourse, Heup Young Kim, Kim Sung-Hae, Kim Yong-Bock, Kim Yung Suk, Richard King, Thomas M. King, Robert M. Kingdon, Ross Kinsler, Hans G. Kippenberg, Cheryl A. 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Yee, Viktor Yelensky, Yeo Khiok-Khng, Gustav K. K. Yeung, Angela Yiu, Amos Yong, Yong Ting Jin, You Bin, Youhanna Nessim Youssef, Eliana Yunes, Robert Michael Zaller, Valarie H. Ziegler, Barbara Brown Zikmund, Joyce Ann Zimmerman, Aurora Zlotnik, Zhuo Xinping
- Edited by Daniel Patte, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
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- The Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity
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Works Cited
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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- 16 July 2009
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- 26 July 2004, pp 263-272
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Frontmatter
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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Acknowledgments
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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3 - Husserl and Schlick on the Logical Form of Experience
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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- 26 July 2004, pp 77-110
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Summary
In the last chapter, we saw how the structuralist picture of meaning that the philosophers of the Vienna Circle formulated led to deep and decisive problems with the explanation of experience. The structuralist conception of meaning arose in the attempt to accommodate experience within a general theory of meaning derived from the practice of logical analysis in the special context of epistemological reconstruction. Even when this epistemological project was abandoned, I argued, the underlying opposition of structuralist explanation to the content of experience has remained characteristic of analytic philosophy of mind, and has culminated in the contemporary problem of explaining consciousness. But because this theoretical configuration has remained in place largely owing to methodological continuities in the elucidatory and explanatory practices characteristic of the analytic tradition, understanding its role in generating the contemporary problem requires an understanding of the philosophical warrant and extent of the methods that have led to it.
Since the 1930s, the legacy of the philosophical investigation into experience has been one of stylistic discord and disunity between the analytic tradition and the phenomenological tradition founded by Edmund Husserl. Particularly with respect to the elucidation of the nature of experience, though, the phenomenological tradition has long purported to offer a genuine alternative to both the linguistic methods of analytic philosophy and the observational methods of empirical science.
1 - Introduction: Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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Summary
The history of analytic philosophy, if viewed as more than a repository for superseded theory, could provide the basis for a transformation in the problem of consciousness with which philosophers of mind are currently grappling. Philosophers of mind seldom discuss or investigate, more than cursorily, the history of the interrelated concepts of mind, consciousness, experience, and the physical world that they rely upon in their theorizing. But these concepts in fact emerge from some of the most interesting and decisive philosophical struggles of the analytic tradition in the twentieth century. Historically, these struggles and their results set up the philosophical space in which contemporary discussion of consciousness moves, defining and delimiting the range of theoretical alternatives accessible to participants in the discussion of the explainability of consciousness and its relation to our understanding of the physical world.
Most contemporary philosophical discussions of consciousness address the question of its explainability in terms of objective, scientific description or the question of its ontological reducibility to objective, scientifically describable phenomena. Philosophers often raise these questions, moreover, against the backdrop of the thought that consciousness has certain properties or features that may make it especially resistant to scientific explanation and description. Paramount among the features of consciousness usually cited as problems for its explanation or reduction are its privacy, subjectivity, ineffability, phenomenality, immediacy, and irreducibly qualitative character.
4 - Ryle on Sensation and the Origin of the Identity Theory
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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By 1950, the theory and practice of linguistic analysis had grown, from its beginnings in the philosophical projects of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, to a position of unquestioned dominance within the English-speaking philosophical world. The period from 1930 to 1950 witnessed a rapid growth of interest in the Vienna Circle's logical empiricism, and the emigration to the United States during this period of key members of the Circle, and others sympathetic to its project, ensured the quick inheritance and large-scale acceptance of “scientific philosophy” and the method of logical analysis in America. There, logical empiricism found common cause with native forms of pragmatism and logical inquiry, and a new generation of philosophers began to absorb the practice of logical analysis, while also subjecting it to decisive modifications. A. J. Ayer's powerful Language, Truth, and Logic, published in 1936, put the programmatic commitments of logical empiricism in a clear and canonical form, contributing greatly to the spread of logical empiricist views and methods both in Britain and in America. Meanwhile, at Cambridge and at Oxford, a somewhat distinct tradition of analysis, tracing ultimately to Russell and Moore's decisive rejection of absolute idealism at the turn of the century, was developing throughout this period. It would culminate in the analytic practice of “ordinary language” philosophers such as Austin, Ryle, and Strawson, philosophers who, while eschewing the formal and symbolic methods characteristic of the Vienna Circle and its descendents, brought the methods of linguistic analysis to a new level of insight and capability in their application of it to the various traditional problems of philosophy.
6 - Consciousness, Language, and the Opening of Philosophical Critique
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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The contemporary discussion of the problem of consciousness, interesting in itself, conceals what might prove to be the most important contribution of analytic philosophy to philosophical history. This contribution is the explicitly linguistic development of a philosophical understanding of ourselves through reflection on the language of consciousness. The tradition of analytic philosophy has comprised a set of characteristically linguistic practices and programs of explanation and analysis, programs that make sense of and support our ability to understand the world and ourselves by clarifying the concepts, terms, and propositions with which we do so. As I have attempted to show in the last four chapters, the contemporary discussion of the problem of explaining consciousness manifests an enduring and repeated problem for these methods as they have ordinarily been understood, a problem that can be clarified only by examining the methodological presuppositions that have dictated the specific forms of analysis characteristic of analytic philosophy at several moments of its history. The investigation of philosophical history reveals the genuine sources of the contemporary problem of consciousness in the analysis of the language that expresses it. This paves the way, in turn, for a future discussion that better satisfies the actual needs that have historically generated and continue to drive the current debates.
In the history I have related, the discussion of conscious experience has consistently taken the form of a dialectical oscillation between the explanatory claims of theories of experience, grounded in particular analytic projects, and forms of resistance to these projects that cite it as unexplainable in their terms.
Notes
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
- Paul M. Livingston
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The problem of explaining consciousness remains a problem about the meaning of language: the ordinary language of consciousness in which we define and express our sensations, thoughts, dreams and memories. This book argues that the problem arises from a quest that has taken shape over the twentieth century, and that the analysis of history provides new resources for understanding and resolving it. Paul Livingston traces the development of the characteristic practices of analytic philosophy to problems about the relationship of experience to linguistic meaning, focusing on the theories of such philosophers as Carnap, Schlick, Neurath, Husserl, Ryle, Putnam, Fodor and Wittgenstein. Clearly written and avoiding technicalities, this book will be eagerly sought out by professionals and graduate students in philosophy and cognitive science.
Contents
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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Index
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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5 - Functionalism and Logical Analysis
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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Thirty-five years after its initial development, the functionalist theory of mind today remains the most popular general position on consciousness among analytic philosophers and scientists alike. The functionalist theory has remained popular, in large part, because it seems to integrate a plausible empirical research program for the investigation of the mind with a wholly physicalist or materialist ontological outlook. But although it is often presented as a metaphysical or empirical position on the nature of the mind, philosophical history shows that functionalism is in fact the latest and most consistent application of an essentially semantic structuralism to the theory of mind. Both in its underlying method and in its fund of decisive arguments, functionalism makes detailed and essential use of reflection on, and reasoning about, the logical and semantic form of language about immediate experience and states of consciousness. Like other theories before it, though, it interprets this reasoning about the language of consciousness as part of an overall theory of mind that explains consciousness by locating it within a total pattern of logical and causal relations.
Viewed in the perspective of philosophical history, the problem of explaining consciousness, as it is currently discussed, arises primarily from the recurrent resistance of consciousness to structuralist programs of explanation. Philosophical history shows the origin of the functionalist theory of mind in a structuralist program of semantic analysis and thereby shows its continuity with the older forms of structuralist explanation we have explored in earlier chapters.
2 - Structuralism and Content in the Protocol Sentence Debate
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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Beginning in the 1920s, the philosophers of the Vienna Circle sought to explain the possibility of scientific knowledge with a new theory of meaning that joined the empirical content of experience to the formal structure of logical inference and derivation. Drawing upon the logical and mathematical tools recently developed by Frege, Hilbert, Russell, and Wittgenstein, proponents of what might be called the structuralist theory of meaning set the private, ineffable, or incommunicable content of subjective experience off against the linguistic form of intersubjective communication and conceptual articulation. The theory drew its ultimate conceptual warrant from the method of logical analysis that inaugurated the analytic tradition itself, but it took specific shape in response to the need to account semantically for the contribution of experience to empirical meaning within a unified, empiricist epistemology of scientific knowledge. Its conception of meaning as ultimately structural, and its assertion of a link between this conception and the possibility of objectivity, would continue to orient the theories and projects of analytic philosophers long after the breakup of the Circle in 1935. But in this conception lay, as well, the ultimate seeds of the downfall of the Circle's originally unified theoretical project. The project came to grief when the philosophers of the Circle could not agree about the logical form of basic observational or “protocol” sentences, sentences capturing the immediate observations to which, the members of the Circle supposed, all empirical knowledge must ultimately trace.
Preface
- Paul M. Livingston, Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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- Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
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- 26 July 2004, pp vii-xii
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The following is an interpretive investigation in the history of analytic philosophy. With it, I hope to begin to show what sort of significance the twentieth-century analytic inquiry into the nature of mind, experience, and consciousness has had for the continuing philosophical consideration of the human self-image. I argue that the contemporary debate about the explanation of consciousness, in particular, embodies an important and unresolved set of concerns about this self-image, and that historical investigation allows us to understand the hitherto obscure ways in which the analytic tradition has been defined by its responses to the distinctive philosophical problems of our understanding of ourselves.
Throughout this inquiry, I have adhered to the methodological assumption that the power of philosophy to yield means and methods of understanding that elucidate and edify – its way of making meaning out of the unthought foundations of our ordinary lives – depends, at each specific historical moment, on its way of imaging or imagining the human, of articulating the specific kind of being that human existence involves. In the broader history of philosophy, however, the greatest enduring significance of this articulation has probably not been its theoretical specification, once and for all, of some fixed truth of human nature, but rather its furtherance of the dialectic of our self-understanding, the interminable historical movement in which each successive image of the human defines the means and practices of thought that will ensure its own partial overcoming.